Optional ID cards on the way - resist

[L00b]

9 The following may be recorded in the entry in the Register for an individual—

 

(a) particulars of every occasion on which information contained in the individual’s entry has been provided to a person;

 

(b) particulars of every person to whom such information has been provided on such an occasion;

 

© other particulars, in relation to each such occasion, of the provision of the information.

These provisions allow any access to your record to be recorded, so there will be a record of every time your card has been checked. This could be you actively handing your card to an official, or to a 3rd party (such as a bank, for the purposes of opening a bank account). It could conceivably be automatic checks by RFID readers in airports or train stations that record every ID card that passes within the range of the reader. Thus allowing the location of your card at set points to be recorded for life.

This section garantees that a record will be made of (b) who accesses your database record, whenever (a) any such person accesses your database record, and for what purposes ©.

 

You may consider this just as much an infringement of your right to privacy (if a pattern of locations can be stored as you suggest) as a measure to safeguard your privacy (by ensuring accountability, through recordal, of any civil servant who accesses your details for whatever purpose).

 

If someone in a position of trust (with access), does access records to sell or use them for criminal purposes on the side (as has been known), the finger will be that much easier to point, and the breach that much quicker to plug.

[esme]

This section garantees that a record (b) will be made of the details of any person who accesses your database record, whenever (a) any such person accesses your database record, and for what purposes ©.

 

You may consider this just as much an infringement of your right to privacy (if a pattern of locations can be stored as you suggest) as a measure to safeguard your privacy (by ensuring accountability, through recordal, of any civil servant who accesses your details for whatever purpose).

 

If someone in a position with access, does access records to sell them for criminal purposes on the side (as has been known), the finger will be that much easier to point, and the breach that much quicker to plug.

ah well that's where the phrase "may be recorded" comes into it's own, I can pretty much guarantee every transaction instigated by my actions will be faithfully recorded in loving detail, however I can only say that civil servant access "may be recorded", it may not, I have no guarantee and no means of checking, very useful phrase is "may be recorded"

 

you wouldn't accept phrases like "may be" and "might be" from a two year old .. "did you take the cookie from the jar ?" .. "I might have done", not exactly an answer is it, so why do we accept this sort of inexactitude in acts of parliament ? is it perhaps to give some "wiggle room" in interpretation perhaps ? like the way the expenses rules were interpreted to include moat cleaning services recently, does the government put these phrases in deliberately so it can say one thing and mean another ? if so why do we put up with it ? and if that's not the reason what is, incompetence ? remember these were shopkeepers and people next door no different to you or I before they stood for parliament, few of which have any specific legal training and yet they produce complex, legally binding documents that are sometimes completely incomprehensible to any without a law degree and we sit back and say "oh they must know what they are doing", why ? they are no different to the members of this board and yet we let them get away with phrases like "may be" in legally binding documents

[Cyclone]

It was on a DNA thread some time ago. A number of families were claiming for the same relative, wheeling her (literally!) between houses when inspectors called to check benefit claims.

 

If she'd been ID'ed as soon as she was in the country, it would have flagged her as being the same person.

 

I'm not sure how that would work. The fraud was that they claimed for her multiple times under multiple different names?

What's to stop her registering for multiple different ID cards to support that? Or are you now tying it to a theoretical national DNA database (that would be currently illegal under european law).

[Magilla]

http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060015_en_5#sch1

 

I know it uses the phrase "may be recorded" a lot but do you seriously think that it won't be, every time the question has been asked if such and so a piece of information will be recorded the answer comes back that it may be, not that it won't, which is about as close to saying "yes" as a politician ever gets

 

Not really, it simply means that there is no hard and fast rule to handle accesses to the database, or any rule or process to sanction those that access it without recording that access.

 

Some people/departments who access it may be recorded, others may not.

 

Basically it's worded to allow abuse of the system in anyway the government see's fit.

[Magilla]

It was on a DNA thread some time ago. A number of families were claiming for the same relative, wheeling her (literally!) between houses when inspectors called to check benefit claims.

 

If she'd been ID'ed as soon as she was in the country, it would have flagged her as being the same person.

 

Unless ofcourse, she applies for several ID cards, or uses fake ones at each address.

[esme]

It was on a DNA thread some time ago. A number of families were claiming for the same relative, wheeling her (literally!) between houses when inspectors called to check benefit claims.

 

If she'd been ID'ed as soon as she was in the country, it would have flagged her as being the same person.

 

and the officials failed to examine her passport, assuming she was an immigrant

 

and if she was born in the UK then there would be other documentation they could have checked

 

and if no documentation or passport was forthcoming they could withhold benefit until it was produced, after all other people on benefits are treated this way regularly, and she did have a family that could look after her while the documentation was produced

 

a failure of officials to check documentation does not justify the ID card scheme, it justifies retraining the officials or possibly hiring people who can do the job

[Cyclone]

Does "much more information" = biometrics? or much more information altogether (relative to the passport DB), of which biometrics is only a part? Define 'much more information' (or link if you please )

Someone else already did the honours.

Given the Gvt's record for data safety (and handling of data breaches), yes, that is a real concern. In the same way there's no need for the Gvt to store personal information which is non-essential for identifying purposes, there's no need for every Gvt agency to have access to the DB - only those which require certainty of identity in their mission (police, social services, inland revenue, off the top of my head).

Every county council, traffic departments, NHS, the list is extremely long.

Has the EU got several Gvts? Or are there several Gvts in the EU? You're needlessly splitting hairs

You appeared to be trying to catch me out somehow, the UK is the only EU government with a plan to record every entry and exit from it's territories.

[esme]

It was on a DNA thread some time ago. A number of families were claiming for the same relative, wheeling her (literally!) between houses when inspectors called to check benefit claims.

 

If she'd been ID'ed as soon as she was in the country, it would have flagged her as being the same person.

and a further nail in this coffin

 

the cost of benefit fraud to the UK for last year, 2008, was estimated at £12.6 million pounds (see http://www.stopbenefitfraudni.gov.uk/cost.htm) the ID card scheme is costing us roughly £5.4 billion pounds to set up and run over the next 10 years (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6033687.stm) or to make it comparable £540 million per year and this isn't counting the cost of the card to the volunteers who purchase one which last I heard was £30 to enrol and £30 for the overheads of wherever you enrolled

 

so just on base costs the chosen solution to benefit fraud costs you roughly 43 times more than the crime is costing you

 

why not look for a more cost effective solution ?

 

if you have a leaky tap thats costing you £10 a year in wasted water do you replace the washer or perhaps even the tap for a comparable cost or do you rip out the entire water system and replace it with a new one for a cost orders of magnitude greater ?

 

or to make the analogy more accurate don't bother fixing the leak but put in a second system anyway which monitors usage and people have to pay to enrol to use, then use the example of the old system to encourage people to use the new one, hoping that enough people will use the new one so you can justify turning the old one off and thereby forcing the remainder to use the new monitored system

[L00b]

You appeared to be trying to catch me out somehow, the UK is the only EU government with a plan to record every entry and exit from it's territories.

No, absolutely not my intent I promise. We're having a constructive chat (at least in my opinion that's what it is) and nothing more.

 

I'm aware of eBorders in the UK, I just wondered why would Shengen-signed up countries appear to record movement as well: why would an Irish (in Dublin) or French (in Paris or Bordeaux) customs officer swipe a French ID card and 2 British passports in a PC-connected reader, from a Shengen-originated flight? What's the data read for? There's either got to be some database it's comparing against, or some database it's being stored in, or both...or what

 

ah well that's where the phrase "may be recorded" comes into it's own, I can pretty much guarantee every transaction instigated by my actions will be faithfully recorded in loving detail, however I can only say that civil servant access "may be recorded", it may not, I have no guarantee and no means of checking, very useful phrase is "may be recorded"

So, in a word: surmising. Note that I can fully accept your interpretation, it's healthy enough to be suspicious of one's governement's ulterior motives. I'm quite comfortable with my own interpretation, from experience

[esme]

yes I am surmising that they will behave in a particular way based on my experience with my government which is different though not necessarily superior to anyone else's experience

 

just as you are surmising that they will behave in a different way based upon your own experience which is different though not necessarily superior to anyone else's experience

 

my experience tells me that the government will interpret the rules in whichever way benefits the government the most and not the electorate, as in for example the recent expenses scandal where rules were interpreted to allow individual MP's to make a profit from a system designed to reimburse legitimate expenses